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Equal Protection and Aesthetic Zoning:
A Possible Crack and a Preemptive Repair
Louis G. Tassinary*
Dawn Jourdan**
Russ Parsonst
I. Introduction
THE STATES' POWER TO REGULATE REASONABLY the use of private
property to promote public health, safety, and welfare derives from the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and includes the power to desig-
nate geographical areas in which the erection of certain structures, the
conduct of particular or all businesses, and other land uses are prohib-
ited.' Behind the seemingly innocuous requirement of reasonableness
lurks the ubiquitous tension between the interests of society and those
of the individual as well as between environmental preservation and
unfettered economic growth.
*Louis G. Tassinary holds a J.D. from Boston College (2003), a Bachelors in Experi-
mental Psychology from Eckerd College (1976), and a Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology
from Dartmouth College (1985). He is currently Executive Associate Dean and Associ-
ate Dean for Research of the College of Architecture, Professor in the Department of
Visualization, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Psychology, and Member of the
Faculty of Neuroscience at Texas A&M University, and a member of the Massachusetts
Bar. Dr. Tassinary's past work has focused on effects of different environments on stress
reduction and recovery, the aesthetic evaluation of computer generated characters, and
the psychometric properties of facial electromyographic measures of emotion. His cur-
rent interests include the use of psychophysiological measures to track cognitive and
emotional processes during rapid decision making, and the use of psychological re-
search in legal reasoning.
**Dawn Jourdan is an assistant professor at the University of Florida, where she
holds a joint appointment in law and urban planning. Dr. Jourdan earned her B.S. in
theatre and urban affairs from Bradley University (1996), J.D./M.U.P. from the Uni-
versity of Kansas (2004), and Ph.D. in urban and regional planning from Florida State
University (2004). Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Florida, Dr. Jourdan
was an assistant professor of urban planning at Texas A&M University and worked
as an associate in the state and local government division at Holland & Knight L.L.P.
in Chicago. Her research interests center around the intersection of human rights and
property rights, with specific interests in the impacts of forcible relocation practices
on families. She is also published in the areas of urban design and historic preserva-
tion law.
tRuss Parsons, Ph.D., is an environmental psychologist and the principal of North-
west Environmental Psychology, in Seattle, Washington. His research interests and
consulting practice focus on environmental perception, office environments, the restor-
ative qualities of natural environments, and environmental psychophysiology.
1. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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In 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parker.'
In expansive obiter dictum, the Berman Court indicated that the concept
of general welfare includes aesthetic values.3 Justice Douglas wrote:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.'
For the half-century since Berman, state and federal courts have used
Justice Douglas' dictum to uphold zoning based on aesthetic consider-
ations.5 Pre-Berman, courts were consistently unwilling to curtail private
property rights on the basis of aesthetic considerations. 6 Post-Berman,
many, if not most, courts are more than willing to do so.' Currently,
a majority of states permit zoning based on aesthetics in combination
with more traditional bases such as health and safety, and a minority
allow zoning based solely on aesthetic factors.' Although it is certainly
plausible to argue that beauty itself serves the public good,9 the more
2. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3. Id. at 31 (holding that health, safety and welfare factors of slum clearance justified
an eminent domain action under the Fifth Amendment). For an in-depth review of Ber-
man and the property conditions of the area of Washington, D.C. at issue in that case,
see Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423
(2010).
4. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
5. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air or Manhattanization?: Communal Aes-
thetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REv. 445, 483-88
(1998); Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can't Build that Here: The Constitutionality of Aes-
thetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013 (1990).
6. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 62
A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905). Commenting on the ability to use the police power to regulate
billboards, at the turn of the prior century the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
observed:
No case has been cited, nor are we aware of any case which holds that a man may be
deprived of his property because his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and
it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private
property without compensation.
Id.
7. See Burton v. City of Alexander, No. 99-D-1233-E, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6651,
at *31-32 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2001) (endorsing the view that the rational basis test is a
rubber stamp with respect to aesthetic based ordinances); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S.
MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
921 (1998) (concluding that aesthetic zoning is "now generally recognized as a valid
police power").
8. Regan, supra note 5, at 1020-26.
9. See Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 697, 744 (1995) (arguing that visual resource protection's
importance "makes it a [public] purpose that may stand alone as an exercise of the
police power").
376 SPRING 2010
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typical argument is that the legitimate public purpose undergirding aes-
thetic zoning is the process by which results are achieved, not the end
product. That is, when a community enacts legislation to implement
its aesthetic ideals, citizens unite and democratically aver a collective
vision about how the physical environment should best be developed.
While individual citizens may certainly disagree with a community's
collective vision,10 the process giving rise to its expression arguably val-
idates the presumption of public good." As a result, most courts view
aesthetic zoning as fitting comfortably within the states' general police
powers over health, safety, and welfare.
A fairly recent Supreme Court decision may empower disaffected
property owners with an alternative way to challenge aesthetic zoning
regulations. 2 In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the property owner al-
leged "the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a con-
dition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply where
the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situ-
ated property owners."' 3 The complaint further described the village's
demand as "irrational and wholly arbitrary." 4 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the property owner could allege an equal protection violation by
asserting the state's action was motivated solely by a "spiteful effort to
'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective."s
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that "[t]hese allegations,
quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to
state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis."'" Al-
though it affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision, the Court explicitly
10. John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 283 (1997).
11. See Poindexter, supra note 5, at 490-92. Commenting on aesthetic regulations
claimed to unfairly target the mobile home industry in Alabama, a district court recently
expressed this perspective quite pointedly:
Linedrawing is more of an art than a science, and legislation often distinguishes
between classes of people in a manner that is overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.
But so what? The manufactured home industry accounts for 25 percent of all new
single-family home starts, pumps more than $ 33 billion annually into the domestic
economy, and has its own congressional caucus. This industry, like any other faction,
can take of itself in the democratic process.
Burton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6651, at *34 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
12. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
13. Id. at 565.
14. Id.
15. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 528 U.S.
562 (2000) (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
16. Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565.
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"[did] not reach the alternative theory of 'subjective ill will' relied on by
[the lower] court.""
Justice Breyer, in a separate concurrence, pointed out that "[tjhis
case . . . does not directly raise the question whether the simple and
common instance of a faulty zoning decision would violate the Equal
Protection Clause."" Justice Breyer's caveat notwithstanding, the strong
implication is that by basing its decision on the arbitrary and capricious
nature of the village's action against a single individual as opposed to
the village's ostensible vindictiveness, the Court reaffirmed that a suf-
ficiently unreasoned or sophistical zoning decision can and will violate
the Equal Protection Clause:
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a "class
of one," where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment. In so doing, we have explained that 'the purpose of the equal protection
clause [sic] of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.'
This article considers whether Olech infers that unreasoned zoning
decisions violate the Equal Protection Clause, and explores the mean-
ing of "similarly situated." The authors further examine what type of
evidence might be necessary to ensure that aesthetic regulations pass
constitutional muster with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.
II. Equal Protection and Means-End Analysis
The classic formulation of the problem of equal protection under the law
was provided by Tussman and tenBroek.20 Their simple yet powerful
insight was that the reasonableness of a legal classification, defined as
whether it treats "similarly" those who are "similarly situated," hinges
upon the adequacy of the coupling between the legislative purpose and
the means employed to accomplish that purpose. 21 As Tussman and
tenBroek conceptualized it, a classification is reasonable and, therefore,
17. Id.
18. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 564 (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445
(1923)) (citations omitted).
20. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REv. 341 (1949).
21. Id. at 346.
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 42, No. 2 SPRING 2010378
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passes constitutional muster if an appropriate fit exists between a class T
(those burdened because they possess the classificatory trait) and a
class M (those the law intended to burden because they create the mis-
chief the law is designed to address).2 2 For example, assume a height
restriction is intended to minimize the dangers of an architectural rig-
marole posed by burgeoning development in an urban area. Means-end
analysis requires courts to ask: Does the class (T) of those building
projects that are prevented because they are more than x stories high
have a sufficiently close "fit" to the class (M) of incoherently designed
buildings?
The benefit of framing the question in this manner is that it allows
the use of elementary set theory2 3 to clarify the nature of the misfit.
To continue with the above example, set theory may show the use of
building height as an aesthetic surrogate to be either underinclusive or
overinclusive. Underinclusion occurs when the burdened class T (build-
ings prevented by the height restriction) excludes some "mischievous"
maverick buildings within class M (buildings the restriction intended to
prevent).24 In other words, some buildings that should be burdened are
not. Overinclusion occurs when the burdened class T improperly in-
cludes some tall, context-sensitive buildings that are not "mischievous"
but are nevertheless forced to carry the undeserved burden. 25 Although
the example classes used here are admittedly buildings, not individuals,
the imposition of building restrictions inevitably burdens the class of
persons who design and construct buildings.
Tussman and tenBroek's model clarifies the nature of means-end
analysis but it is not a perfect model.26 Perhaps its most fundamental
weakness is that it does not explicitly deal with the problem of alter-
natives. 27 The model reveals when a particular legal classification is
under- or overinclusive in the abstract but it is not designed to answer
the question, "Compared to whom or what?" 28 An example of how this
22. Id.
23. See CLYDE H. COOMBS, ROBYN M. DAWEs & AMos TVERSKY, MATHEMATICAL
PSYCHOLOGY: AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION 351-71 (1970).
24. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at 348.
25. Id. at 351.
26. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
UCLA L. REv. 447 (1989) (discussing an alternative "misfit" analysis model thorough
which courts can engage in means-ends rationality).
27. See generally Zygmunt J. B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Look-
ing Glass ofEminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Sub-
stantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
661, 667-78 (1989) (illustrating two paradigms of rationality-arbitrariness review).
28. Simons, supra note 26, at 459.
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model can fail to capture such relevant issues is poignantly revealed in
the case that infused aesthetic concerns into modern police power juris-
prudence, Berman v. Parker29:
But what did Mr. Berman really want to tell the courts? In part, surely he wanted to
argue that he considered this a stupid taking-it did not make sense. It did undoubt-
edly irk him that someone else might reap the future profits of his parcel. A major
part of his common-sense argument was, however, that, because his property was not
blighted, it did not logically serve the public purpose to redevelop it, especially in
light of the costs the public would have to pay to buy it, tear it down, and rebuild it.
Analytically, this argument does not deny that such redevelopment might ultimately
serve public ends. Rather, it asserts that it was, in one sense of the word, "unneces-
sary": given the costs to the public and Mr. Berman, it was not rational to choose to
condemn and redevelop his unblighted property rather than just leave it in status quo.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it.30
The justices, however, never confronted the question of specific
rationality-that is, whether condemning this particular parcel served
the public redevelopment purpose.31 Instead, "the decision dealt with
means-ends rationality in relentlessly general terms, and the argument
as to specific rationality ultimately was finessed away via a presump-
tion of validity."32
The Olech decision suggests that it may no longer be as easy to "fi-
nesse" the argument of specific rationality via arguments relating to the
presumption of validity. What is therefore needed is a model that will
assist courts in making decisions relating to the extent to which classi-
fications arising from aesthetic regulations result in roughly equivalent
congeners; that is, to what extent classifications result in protagonists
similarly situated with respect to burdens that actually advance an aes-
thetic purpose." At least one such model is possible, and it is a model
familiar to social scientists.
III. Construct Validation Model'
Figure 1 depicts the basic inferential task confronting an empirical so-
cial scientist. Typically, a researcher attempts to make inferences about
hypothetical constructs (such as scenic beauty, control, stress, and crowd-
ing). To do so requires operationalizing those constructs so that mean-
ingful measurements can be made in a manner that others can replicate.
29. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
30. Plater & Norine, supra note 27, at 686 (footnote omitted).
31. Id.; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 31, 34.
32. Plater & Norine, supra note 27, at 686 (emphasis added).
33. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1989).
34. Donald T. Campbell and Donald W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Valida-
tion by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81, 81-105 (1959).
SPRING 2010380 THE U.RBAN LAWYER VOL. 42, No. 2
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Figure 1
Construct A0 ConstructB
Operation X *_Operation Y
For example, suppose an investigator hypothesizes that perceived loss
of scenic beauty is stressful. This hypothesis implies a causal relation-
ship between two constructs. Testing the hypothesis, however, requires
operational definitions of both "perceived loss of scenic beauty" and
"stress." A possible operational definition of "perceived loss of scenic
beauty" is digitally altered images of the viewscape of Estes Park, Colo-
rado streets, with high-rise apartments hiding the Rocky Mountains. An
operational measurement of "stress" is physiological reactivity, such as
changes in blood pressure. Such a simple conceptual model is depicted
in Figure 2.
Two inferential problems become immediately clear, and are func-
tionally equivalent to the problems of overinclusion and underinclusion
in the means-end analysis outlined by Tussman and tenBroek.35 First,
any one operational definition may capture only part of the underly-
ing construct; and second, operational definitions are multidimensional
and may represent two or more constructs.3 6 These relationships are
depicted graphically in Figure 3.
35. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, 348-53.
36. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DE-
SIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 59-70 (1979).
381
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Figure 2
Loss of SrsScenic Beauty Srs
Apar timents
in the )Blood Pressure
Rockies
Figure 3
Construct A S4
9 gogoldOperation X
"-4- MO
Underrepresentativeness Overrepresentativeness
Note that the claim that a construct is either underrepresented or
overrepresented at the operational level assumes that the construct is
clearly defined in the first place. Consequently, construct invalidity can
be seen as arising from problems with methods or operations. Analo-
gously, albeit conversely, the claim that a legislative means is either
overinclusive or underinclusive presumes that the legislative purpose or
end is clearly defined.
382 SPRING 2010
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The under- and overrepresentation problems are endemic to scientific
inquiry as well as to legislative enactments, suggesting that reliance on
any one operation or legislative means nearly always leads to distorted
conclusions or undue burdens. The empirical solution to both sets of
problems is multiple operationalism; that is, to specify a set of cor-
respondence rules that associate a singe concept (end) with multiple
operations (means). Confidence in construct relationships is attained
only when empirical relationships replicate across multiple operations.
Figure 4 depicts the logic of multiple operationalism.
In each situation a different set of operations is used, each of which
is overrepresented and underrepresented. But across situations, the
''excess" representation varies while the relation between constructs
A and B remains constant. Based on supportive and consistent em-
pirical relationships, the most rational explanation for the entire set
of results is that A and B are linked in some substantive and real
manner. Although it is not possible to rule out entirely the possibility
that, for example, C caused D in Study 1, E caused F in Study 2, and
G caused H in Study 3, such a complex model is less parsimonious and
becomes less plausible (less rational) as additional supportive studies
are added.
In the social sciences, construct validation is recognized to be a slow,
methodical process that typically takes years to complete. 37 While an
analogy to the slow, methodical process of the common law is initially
appealing, clearly the application of such a standard to means-end
analysis would effectively preclude any legislative classifications. A
common approach of legislatures and administrative agencies in other
domains is to rely upon the scientific community to supply relevant data
to ensure that the means employed to accomplish a legitimate end are
both rational and efficient." Recent data from the field of environmental
psychology suggest that, as least with respect to scenic aesthetics, this
approach may provide a parry to the "Pandora's box" of specific ratio-
nality released by the Olech decision. 39
37. See, e.g., Gary F. Koeske & Randi Daimon Koeske, Construct Validity of the
Maslach Burnout Inventory: A Critical Review and Reconceptualization, 25 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. ScI. 131 (1989).
38. Cf. Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L.
REV. 111, 111 (1997) (discussing courts' scrutiny of scientific evidence prior to admit-
tance, including consideration of rate of error, testability, and peer review).
39. See, e.g., Ke-Tsung Han, Responses to Six Major Terrestrial Biomes in Terms
of Scenic Beauty, Preference, and Restortativeness, 35 ENv'T & BEHAv. 529 (2007);
Koeske & Koeske, supra note 37.
383
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IV. Evolutionary and Scientific Aesthetics
In 1847, just two years before Charles Darwin published The Origin
of Species,40 Herbert Spencer published a short article on how art may
have evolved from early adaptive behaviors. 4 1 Darwin elaborated upon
40. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION,
OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVORED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (New York,
J.A. Hill & Co., 1904) (1859).
41. Herbert Spencer, The Origin and Function of Music, FRASER'S MAG., Oct.
1857, reprinted in HERBERT SPENCER, 2 ESSAYS: SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, & SPECU-
LATIVE 400 (library ed., 89) available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com
staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=336&chapter- 12353&layout=html&Itemid=27.
THE U.RBAN LAWYER VOL. 42, No. 2 SPRING 20 10384
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Spencer's seminal idea, spurring subsequent theorists in the biological
and social sciences to speculate as to how behaviors selected originally
for relative survival and reproductive success evolved into the making
of and appreciation for art.42 Not surprisingly, philosopher aestheticians
almost immediately dismissed the speculation,43 and it limped along as
a scientific backwater throughout most of the twentieth century" until
its recent rebirth.45 This rebirth, however, focuses not only on how such
psychological skills developed from humbler beginnings, but also on
how aesthetic production and perception is necessary to survival and
reproduction. 46
An even longer historical perspective suggests that naturalistic, pic-
turesque and park-like landscape ideals attributed solely to the rela-
tively recent rise of scenic aesthetics47 are, in reality, corporeal examples
sampled from a population of pastoral and Arcadian48 idylls that dates
42. See, e.g., GRANT ALLEN, PHYSIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS (1877); DESMOND MOR-
RIS, THE BIOLOGY OF ART: A STUDY OF THE PICTURE-MAKING BEHAVIOUR OF THE
GREAT APES AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HUMAN ART (1962); Paul Ziff, Art and Socio-
biology, 90 MIND 505 (1981).
43. BERNARD BOSANQUET, A HISTORY OF AESTHETIC 441 (1904).
44. See, e.g., D.E. BERLYNE, AESTHETICS AND PSYCHOBIOLOGY (1971); ALBERT R.
CHANDLER, BEAUTY AND HUMAN NATURE: ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AESTHETICS
(1934); THOMAS MUNRO, THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN AESTHETICS (1928); R.W. PICK-
FORD, PSYCHOLOGY AND VISUAL AESTHETICS (1972).
45. See, e.g., BIOPOETICS: EVOLUTIONARY EXPLORATIONS IN THE ARTS (Brett
Cooke & Frederick Turner eds., 1999).
46. See, e.g., BEAUTY AND THE BRAIN: BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AESTHETICS (Ingo
Rentschler, David Epstein & Barbara Herzberger eds., 1989); ELLEN DISSANAYAKE,
ART AND INTIMACY: HOW THE ARTS BEGAN (2000); STEVEN MITHEN, THE PREHIS-
TORY OF THE MIND: THE COGNITIVE ORIGINS OF ART, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 154-63
(1996).
47. Paul H. Gobster, An Ecological Aesthetic for Forest Landscape Management, 18
LANDSCAPE J. 54, 55-56 (1999).
48. The term "Arcadian" refers generally to a people indigenous to the hills of the
Peloponnesos in southern Greece, pre-dating both the Dorian invasions and the estab-
lishment of the Olympian Pantheon. Recent evidence suggests that they may have in-
habited the area as early as 50,000 years ago causing, through millennia of poor land
management, the severe erosion that created the wasteland of dry shrubs and rocks we
visit today. See Curtis N. Runnels, Environmental Degradation in Ancient Greece, 272
ScI. AM. 96 (1995). One historian defines "Arcadian" in the following manner:
The popular term "Arcadian," describes a utopian garden paradise where serene pas-
toral folk drink, dance and lounge around in an endless summer....
This atmosphere of nostalgia in Utopia has survived as the philosopher's definition
of "Arcadia," leaving behind a vital and ancient tapestry of folklore. In the reality
of mythological Arcadia there were many terrifying dangers, the least of which was
death, for its vast population of nymphs, dryads, naiads, satyrs, fauns, Cyclops and
lesser gods such as Pan and occasionally Dionysus. Perhaps it was these disenfran-
chised deities who brought with them the carpet of lush vegetation that transformed
the rocky wasteland into the wild and crazy playground of Ovid's "Metamorphoses".
[sic] In a sense, classical Arcadia was never a Utopia, and its character is as complex
and mysterious as the human psyche.
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back to the beginnings of human civilization. 49 From glimpses of "na-
ture writing" on ancient Sumerian stone tablets to the pastoral poetry of
Theocritus and Virgil to the sustainable land practices of the early kib-
butzim and Benedictine Monks,o the balance Arcadia struck between
nature in the raw and unrestrained urbanism is one that people have
sought throughout human history. Pioneering environmentalist and bac-
teriologist Rene Dubos argued that historical similarities in Arcadian
human settlement patterns and land manipulations reflect our evolu-
tionary past.' Our species has had a tendency to settle near water and
prospect and refuge opportunities, when possible, and to manipulate
environments to approximate these and other savanna-like characteris-
tics when it was not.5 2
Interestingly, the Arcadian idyll has a counterpart in modern empiri-
cal research on landscape preferences. Overwhelmingly, people in the
U.S. aesthetically prefer natural to urbanized environments, 4 and natu-
ral environments of a particular sort are liked best of all." People prefer
fairly open areas with low ground cover, a water source directly (pond,
stream) or indirectly (flowering plants, green vegetation) indicated, and
occasional clumps of trees and shrubs, with the whole presenting a some-
what complex yet comprehensible scene." This amalgam of elements is
noteworthy not only for its resemblance to historically recurrent Arca-
dian idylls, but also for its similarity to the savanna environments of our
speciation. The similarities have prompted multiple researchers to pro-
pose evolutionary explanations for environmental aesthetics. 7 Though
differences exist among these evolutionary approaches, most empha-
Elsie Russell, On the Arcadian Theme, http://www.pamasse.com/etpnt.htm (last visited
March 21, 2010).
49. See EVAN EISENBERG, THE ECOLOGY OF EDEN (1998).
50. See id.
51. See RENE J. DUBos, A GOD WITHIN (1972); RENE J. DuBos, THE WOOING OF
EARTH: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MAN'S USE OF NATURE (1980).
52. See JAY APPLETON, THE EXPERIENCE OF LANDSCAPE (rev. ed. 1996).
53. Robert G. Ribe, The Aesthetics of Forestry: What has Empirical Preference Re-
search Taught Us? 13 ENVTL. MGMT. 55 (1989).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., APPLETON, supra note 52; RACHEL KAPLAN & STEPHEN KAPLAN, THE
EXPERIENCE OF NATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1989); Gordon H. Orians &
Judith H. Heerwagen, Evolved Responses to Landscapes, in THE ADAPTED MIND: Evo-
LUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 111, 111-23 (Jerome H.
Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1992); R. S. Ulrich, Aesthetic and Affective
Responses to Natural Environments, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT (I. Alt-
man & J.F. Wohlwill eds., 1983).
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size the centrality of perception and emotion in human-environment
transactions, and all see these processes as vital to the performance of
such survival behaviors as habitat selection, harm avoidance, shelter-
seeking, and the location of food and water resources.
Much of the support for these theories comes from the past thirty
years of landscape research in North America, where studied popula-
tions broadly agree in favoring savanna-like environments. One of the
earliest examinations of evolutionary theories of landscape preferences
was reported by Balling and Falk,58 who reasoned that cultural (and
other learned) influences on landscape perception should be least among
those least exposed to their culture, children. They solicited landscape
preference ratings from eight-, eleven-, and fourteen-year-old children;
college students; adults; and senior citizens. All were shown landscape
scenes representing savannas, tropical forests, temperate deciduous for-
ests, coniferous forests, and deserts. The findings generally supported
an evolutionary model of landscape preferences, with younger chil-
dren (the eight- and eleven-year-olds) clearly favoring savannas over
other landscape types while older participants found the savannas and
more familiar landscapes (deciduous and coniferous forests) equally
pleasing.59
Researchers also cite cross-cultural similarities in landscape prefer-
ences as evidence of an evolutionary contribution to environmental aes-
thetics. Similarities in landscape preferences tend to be greater among
similar cultures,' and less so among dissimilar ones.6' However, even
among dissimilar cultures, there is evidence of substantial overlap in how
people understand and evaluate environments. At least one researcher
has found, for example, that Chinese students and British profession-
als produce very similar semantic factor structures when responding to
architectural and landscape stimuli,62 semantic factors that are in turn
58. John D. Balling & John H. Falk, Development of Visual Preference for Natural
Environments, 14 ENV'T & BEHAv. 5, 5-28 (1982).
59. Id.
60. Elwood L. Shafer & Michael Tooby, Landscape Preferences: An International
Replication, 5 J. LEISURE RES. 60 (1973); R. S. Ulrich, Visual Landscape Preference:
A Model and Application, 7 MAN-ENV'T Sys. 279 (1977); E.H. Zube & LV. Mills,
Cross-cultural Explorations in Landscape Perception, in STUDIES IN LANDSCAPE PER-
CEPTION 162, 167 (E. H. Zube ed., 1976).
61. J. Sonnenfeld, Environmental Perception and Adaptation Level in the Arc-
tic, in ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR 42 (D. Lowenthal ed., 1967);
E. H. Zube & David G. Pitt, Cross-cultural Perceptions of Scenic and Heritage Land-
scapes, 8 LANDSCAPE PLAN. 69, 69-87 (1981).
62. K. Kwok, Semantic Evaluation ofPerceived Environment: A Cross-cultural Rep-
lication, 9 MAN-ENV'T Sys. 243, 243-49 (1979).
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very similar to those reported for Swedes.63 Yang and his colleagues
examined differences in the way Korean and Western groups perceive
and evaluate environments, finding that study participants from these
cultures categorize environments in much the same way6" and prefer the
same landscape style and elements.65 Furthermore, differences in land-
scape preferences between Western landscape design experts and vari-
ous Chinese subpopulations are more readily accounted for by urban
versus rural residential experience than by culture of origin.'
Despite these cross-cultural similarities in aesthetic and other re-
sponses to environments, very little cross-cultural research has explic-
itly examined evolutionary models of environmental aesthetics. One
notable exception is a study comparing the effects of culture, occupa-
tion, symbolic significance of the landscape, and theoretically assigned
beauty of the landscape to participants' assessments of scenic beauty,
picnic, and residential preferences.67 The study compared Koreans and
Texans with various occupations (farmers, landscape architecture stu-
dents, and others), testing their responses to landscapes with positive
semantic associations for Koreans (for example, the location of a Bud-
dhist temple), landscapes with positive associations for Texans (the
campus of a highly-regarded university), and landscapes with no strong
semantic associations for either group.68 Participants rated photographs
representing high- and low-beauty landscape exemplars (as defined by
R. Kaplan and S. Kaplan's evolutionary theory of environmental aes-
thetics69) in each of the semantic landscape categories.
Though this was a fairly complex study testing an ambitious model of
cognitive and affective responses to landscapes and involving multiple
independent and dependent variables, the results were strikingly uni-
form. Koreans and Texans reported very similar scenic beauty, picnic
and living preferences, regardless of the semantic associations of the
63. R. KOLLER, NAT'L SWED. INST. FOR BLDG. RESEARCH, A SEMANTIC MODEL FOR
DESCRIBING PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENT (1972) (Research Document D12).
64. Byoung-E Yang & Rachel Kaplan, The Perception of Landscape Style: A Cross-
Cultural Comparison, 19 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 251, 251-62 (1990).
65. Byoung-E Yang & Terry J. Brown, A Cross-cultural Comparison of Preferences
for Landscape Styles and Landscape Elements, 24 ENV'T & BEHAv. 471 (1992).
66. Kongjian Yu, Cultural Variations in Landscape Preference: Comparisons Among
Chinese Sub-groups and Western Design Experts, 32 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 107
(1995).
67. Y.K. Yi, Affect and Cognition Interface in Aesthetic Experiences of Landscape
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University) (on file with Texas
A&M University Library).
68. Id.
69. See KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 57.
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landscapes being judged. 0 Indeed, though some statistically significant
differences exist for the semantic factors across the three judgments,
the theoretically assigned aesthetic value of the scenes was clearly the
most important factor." The results were nearly the same when prefer-
ence ratings were compared among farmers, landscape architects, and
others. Effect sizes for the independent variables showed that theoreti-
cally assigned scenic beauty accounted for twenty-seven to forty per-
cent of the variance in the three preference judgments, while the other
factors (culture, semantic associations, and occupational status) com-
bined to account for less than ten percent of the variance in each of the
judgments.72
Other researchers have tested evolutionary hypotheses that focus on
specific perceptual features, highlighting the importance of seemingly
casual or passive encounters with environments. Several evolutionary
theories,73 for instance, propose that environments with clear focal fea-
tures are preferred over environments without them; and self-report data
lend support to this proposition.74 Results from eye tracking research
also suggest that people are more apt to examine preferred relative to
nonpreferred environmental scenes by using focal clusters of eye fixa-
tions." Further, prospect focal features in environmental scenes7 6 are
found to elicit eye fixations of greater duration than would be expected
by chance." Preferences for tree shapes also highlight the importance
of perceptual features for environmental aesthetics. Studies of North
American 8 and cross-cultural7 9 populations suggest that spreading and
globular, acacia-like tree shapes are preferred over others; and in par-
ticular, acacia tree shapes associated with highly productive savanna
habitats are preferred over acacias from less productive habitats." Thus,
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; Ulrich, supra note 57.
74. Ulrich, supra note 57.
75. R. Parsons & M. Olson, Eye Movements and Landscape Aesthetics: Evidence for
Differential Scanning as a Function of Aesthetic Preferences, 35 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
S63 (Supp. 1998).
76. See APPLETON, supra note 52.
77. L. G. Tassinary, S. P. Johnson, K. Lawson & R. Parsons, Experimental Examina-
tion of the Prospect-refuge Theory, 36 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY Si 13 (1999).
78. Joshua Summit & Robert Sommer, Further Studies of Preferred Tree Shapes, 31
ENV'T & BEHAv. 550 (1999).
79. Robert Sommer & Joshua Summit, Cross-National Rankings of Tree Shape, 8
ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 327 (1996).
80. Orians & Heerwagen, supra note 57, at 111-23.
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whether the focus is on specific perceptual features of the environ-
ment or on the perception of broader environmental tableaux, repeated
findings of intra- and inter-cultural similarity in aesthetic preferences
strongly suggest that any proposed aesthetic criteria that ignore evolu-
tionary contributions are arguably "irrational." In addition, because per-
ceived structural characteristics (relatively open fore- and mid-grounds
or occasional clumps of trees) and specific content and perceptual fea-
tures (water and tree shapes) clearly influence landscape preferences
in theoretically meaningful ways, this body of research contradicts the
notion that visual perception is a shallow or insignificant component
of the human-environment transactions involved in aesthetic landscape
experiences. And finally, to the extent that similarities in landscape
preferences raise the possibility of heritable predispositions favoring
certain environmental features and configurations, this work suggests
that the perceptual processing of environmental information (and the
associated affective responding) may be less malleable than is com-
monly supposed.8'
In addition, much of the impetus for research on the restorative ben-
efits of nature has come from actively engaged recreationists in scenic
settings, self-reporting stress reduction, and other psychological ben-
efits. 82 It is important to note that much of the affectively oriented re-
search specifically investigating the physiological restorative benefits
of nature has focused on physically passive participants in laboratory
experiments. 83 The reported mood altering and stress reduction effects
have often been short lived, at least in terms of the physiological return
to baseline that has been reported. 84 But, both the physical passivity in
this work and the short lived nature of the effects are due to practical
constraints inherent in conducting psychophysiological research in the
laboratory, not to any theoretical propositions regarding the restorative
benefits of scenic (Arcadian and savanna-like) environments." Even
when physiological return to baseline is quick and mood alterations
brief, we should not necessarily infer from this brevity that the effects
produced by perceptual encounters with scenic landscapes are shallow,
81. Gobster, supra note 47, at 55-56.
82. BENEFITS OF LEISURE (B. L. Driver, Perry J. Brown & George L. Peterson eds.,
1991) (defining and quantifying the impact of leisure on society).
83. For a review, see Russ Parsons & Louis G. Tassinary, Environmental Psy-
chophysiology, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. (Robert B. Bechtel &
Arza Churchman eds., 2002)
84. Russ Parsons & Terry C. Daniels, Good Looking: In Defense of Scenic Land-
scape Aesthetics, 60 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 43 (June 2002).
85. Ulrich, supra note 57.
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short lived, or limited to the perceptual and affective domains. To cite
a recent example from the psychophysiological restorative benefits lit-
erature, brief viewing of scenic environmental surrogates can not only
facilitate recovery from stressors, but can also gird one for subsequent
stressful encounters and lead to improved performance on a subsequent
cognitive task.8 6 And, in the behavioral literature more generally, Isen
and her colleagues"" have published extensively on the beneficial effects
of brief, mild-positive moods on cognitive flexibility (such as creative
problem solving).8
If we generalize from these psychophysiological laboratory findings
to the recreational behaviors and scenic settings that spawned restor-
ative environments research,89 the contention that perceptually driven,
short lived mood changes are somehow arbitrary or capricious appears
unfounded. When one is camping, hiking, fishing, or the like in a sce-
nic environment, short lived, perceptually induced positive moods are
typically followed (often in rapid succession) by other perceptually
induced positive moods, such that long-lasting, substantial positive
psychological experiences are not uncommon.90 Thus, neither the psy-
chophysiological laboratory research on restorative benefits9 1 nor the
consideration of these findings appropriately generalized to recreational
settings supports an argument that aesthetic values are shallow, unim-
portant, or rationally insufficient to support zoning regulations.
V. Conclusion
A recently published article by Kimberly Smith begins with the follow-
ing hypothetical:
Picture this scenario: The Senate has convened to debate whether to initiate an air
war in Bosnia. The Senators gravely evaluate strategies, estimate casualties, compare
costs and benefits. Suddenly in the midst of these deliberations, a senior legisla-
tor takes the floor and solemnly declares, "We're overlooking a critical issue. How
86. R. Parsons et al., The View from the Road: Implications for Stress Recovery and
Immunization, 18 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 113 (1998).
87. Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 521
(Tim Dalgleish & Mick Power eds., 1999).
88. Id.
89. See Parsons & Daniels, supra note 84.
90. See Laura M. Fredrickson & Dorothy H. Anderson, A Qualitative Exploration of
the Wilderness Experience as a Source of Spiritual Inspiration, 19 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL.
21, 21-22 (1999).
91. Benefits have been shown to be both affective and cognitive in nature. For a
review, see Russ Parsons & Terry Hartig, Environmental Psychophysiology, in HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY (Louis G. Tassinary, John T. Cacioppo & Gary Berntson
eds., 3d ed. 2007).
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will intensive bombing will [sic] affect the Bosnian scenery? How will it impact the
lovely forests, the exquisite wildflowers, and clarity and serenity of the sunrise? Any
action that threatens such beauty is surely wrong."
... How would those staid, serious representatives respond to a brief advocating the
preservation of the beauty of the Bosnian countryside? Could an argument strictly
from natural beauty get a hearing in democratic deliberation? Should it? 2
Thus, the standard pluralist model of democracy does not appear to pro-
vide much guidance on the legitimacy of excluding interests from the
political arena (for example, seeking religious converts, racial and sexist
agendas, etc.), let alone pursuing aesthetic interests through politics. 93
Smith argues that effective deliberation 94 requires some initial gate keep-
ing in order to prevent "viable claims from being buried under a mass
of hopeless causes as well as [to preserve] something of the dignity and
seriousness of the political arena."95 Subsequent to a careful legal and
policy based analysis she concludes that citizens should actively seek
aesthetic goals through the political arena because we must aspire to "a
democracy in which sensitive aesthetes and expressive and emotional
forms of discourse have a secure place . . . [in order to avoid] cultural
mediocrity, degraded materialism and suffocated human spirits."96
Cape Wind Associates' proposal to erect a phalanx of nearly two
hundred 400-foot-tall wind turbines on a shallow portion of Nantucket
Sound off the coast of Massachusetts represents a muted epitome of this
hypothetical.97 The Cape Cod wind project would be the nation's first
ever offshore wind farm and its largest renewable energy installation. If
successful, the project would prove to the rest of the nation that a siz-
able community of approximately 250,000 residents can theoretically
be nearly energy independent.9 8 A dilemma exists, however, because
the proposed "wind farm would be located within 13 miles of the shores
of two of the most coveted and environmentally protected resort islands
[and coastlines] in the nation"-areas with some of the "most rigorous
local development codes and habitat protections in the nation."99
92. Kimberly K. Smith, Mere Taste: Democracy and the Politics of Beauty, 7 Wis.
ENVTL. L.J. 151, 151-52 (2000).
93. Id. at 152.
94. Smith's concept of "effective deliberation" is strikingly similar to Plater & Nori-
ne's concept of "specific rationality." See Platter & Norine, supra note 27.
95. Smith, supra note 92, at 153.
96. Id. at 194-95.
97. Amanda Little, Activists are Split on a Proposed Wind Project off Cape Cod,
GiusT: A BEACON IN THE SMOG, http://www.grist.org/news/powers/2002/12/19/
griscom-windmill/ (Dec. 19,2002) (last visited March 21, 2010).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The most tenable concern of the project's opponents pertains to the
coveted ocean views. The disruption of the unobstructed viewshed is
not in contention. Rather, the relative importance of such an aesthetic
value is what is at issue; that is, just as in Smith's more extreme hypo-
thetical, the question of how the wind turbines will affect the Massachu-
setts Bay scenery is at the core of the present imbroglio.
To justify preserving existing landscapes or urbanscapes via the codi-
fication of aesthetic values requires the premise that beauty is essential
to our mental, physical, and spiritual health-a basic need, albeit one
that may require the education of our individual and collective atten-
tion. Ridiculing aesthetic values as stemming from an elitist fastidious-
ness is one way to diminish their role in public policy and thus make
such regulations appear necessarily arbitrary and arguably capricious.
As put by some earlier courts, "Aesthetic considerations are fraught
with subjectivity. One man's pleasure may be another man's perturba-
tion, and vice versa."'" "Successive city councils might never agree as
to what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint. . . . The world
would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations were permitted
to govern the use of the police power."' 0 '
The central constitutional (equal protection) question should not be
whether the codification of aesthetic values achieves an ideal level of
rationality in theory, and should not be limited to issues of procedural
due process; the question should be whether codification can achieve
an acceptable level of rationality in practice. That question, as we have
seen, is best resolved empirically. While disputes over the relative
value of the "seamless continuity of the horizon line,"'02 whether from
Pompey's Pillar'0 or Cape Cod, may not be easily settled, they are not
intrinsically more or less rational than debates over the value of stan-
dardized testing, English immersion, or school vouchers. In each of the
100. Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
101. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925).
102. Little, supra note 97.
103. See generally America's 11 Most Endangered Historic Places, National Trust for
Historic Preservation, http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/moun
tains-plains-region/pompeys-pillar.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
On the south bank of the Yellowstone River in Montana, Pompey's Pillar, a sandstone
butte that is approximately 100 feet tall, bears the only physical evidence of the re-
markable 8,000-mile expedition of Lewis and Clark.... In the shadow of Pompey's
Pillar, United Harvest Corporation, a grain exporting conglomerate, [erected] a 100-
acre grain-loading trucking and railroad terminal with four looming 150-foot-tall
grain elevators.
Id.
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latter cases the construct validation process has progressed to the point
were experts in the relevant social sciences share a common language
allowing for meaningful debate-one that fuels the generation of fal-
sifiable knowledge claims. Codified aesthetic values will surpass the
"specific rationality" Plimsoll mark, and thus pass constitutional mus-
ter, if tethered to equivalent empirical social science. The values will
likely "sink the ship," however, should the courts embrace the line of
reasoning proffered by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, and if lawmakers continue to view aesthetic values as whimsy
shielded from scrutiny by the presumption of validity.
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